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The market now offers consumers an expanding array of options to off-
set the harms of their consumption.' Travel websites and politicians alike
sell the advantages of carbon offsetting. But offsetting options need not be
limited to correcting for environmental harm; consumption is also associated
with worker exploitation and people struggling with poverty. Individuals
can and do respond to such poverty-related harms by altering their consump-
tion decisions and by making voluntary supplemental payments following
consumption. This Essay explores the possibility of poverty offsetting.
Building upon carbon offsetting's basic insight-that people should correct
for the negative externalities of their consumption-poverty-offsetting insti-
tutions would enable individuals to correct for the poverty-related harms as-
sociated with their consumption.
Although the convenient accounting of consumers and producers often
serves to deny the existence of harms tied to consumption, many forms of
consumption are associated with poverty and poverty-related externalities.
By emphasizing that consumption is not an isolated activity but, instead,
implicates the consumer in the entire line of production and distribution,
poverty-offsetting institutions can help change the norms surrounding con-
sumption. Poverty offsetting offers the possibility of raising general aware-
ness of the relationship between consumption and poverty. Consumer
indifference to the conditions and wages received by workers in the produc-
tion of particular products helps ensure both that prices are kept low and that
many people continue to lead lives marked by poverty. Even if some such
production practices arguably raise living standards compared to the false
alternative of unemployment, people are, or should be, troubled by the pov-
erty associated with their consumption. Awareness of the true social costs of
consumption hopefully will lead to consumer-demanded improvements in
how goods make it to the market, but even if it does not do so immediately,
poverty-offsetting institutions provide a direct mechanism for socially
minded consumers to correct for the harms of their consumption.
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By treating production processes as irrelevant or of secondary impor-
tance except in rare circumstances, market practices and market regulations
implicitly suggest that consumers should not concern themselves with the
production processes behind particular goods and that supplemental offset-
ting payments are nonsensical. 2 At its core, offsetting amounts to a volun-
tary supplemental payment-motivated by a sense of social responsibility-
made in connection with consumption. It is hard to understand why people
would make such payments if people are nothing but wealth maximizers.
Rational market actors seek goods at the lowest price, and this downward
price pressure is but an example of the power of competition to improve
human well-being. From this perspective, the ideal market is one with mini-
mal government involvement and maximum space for entrepreneurs to seek
out new opportunities. Without question, capitalism, coupled with increased
global trade, has improved the lives of many people across the globe.' In-
deed, frequently using the rising standards of living in Asia as the best con-
temporary example, some argue that capitalism has been the single most
important tool in the fight against poverty. Attention to production
processes, the thinking goes, is misguided in light of the dynamic power of
capitalism. Concern for anything other than low price threatens to kill the
golden goose.
At the extreme, free-market ideologues deny the need for the existing
production governance laws promulgated and administered by the federal
government domestically, to say nothing of the possibility of enhanced inter-
national worker protections and rights. Far-right politicians and media out-
lets accordingly stir up their base with periodic calls to abolish or impose
severe funding cuts on agencies such the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Similarly, propos-
als to increase the minimum wage or support the ability of workers to union-
ize inspire an inevitable backlash with rhetoric that suggests that the U.S.
economy would collapse were all workers to earn a living wage. The intel-
lectual purity of free-market ideology is strained slightly by general ac-
knowledgement that slavery and child labor is wrong, that companies ought
to be prevented from simply dumping their waste into neighboring rivers,
and that government should protect consumers from defective products. But
2 For more on the process/product distinction, see generally Douglas A. Kysar, Preftr-
ences ftr Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer
Choice, 118 HARV. L. Ryv. 525 (2004).
'See Robert Howse, The End oJthe Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L.
REv. 1528, 1531 (2008) (book review). The debate on whether capitalism alleviates or causes
poverty is, not surprisingly, expansive. See Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in
Distributive Justice: The Welftre Conundrum, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 235, 251-52 (1994) (summa-
rizing both sides of the debate). My view is that antipoverty advocates, even as they push for a
better structure and improved social safety net, ought to acknowledge the transformative as-
pects of capitalism. See also Rosser, supra note 1, at 89 n.213 (discussing the relationship
between capitalism and poverty). But see Barbara Stark, Jam Tomorrow: Distributive Justice
and the Limits of International Economic Law, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 3, 14 (2010) (noting
that the premise that trade boosts economic growth and reduces poverty and inequality "has
been criticized as the self-serving ideology of the developed states").
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whether out of intellectual precommitment to free trade or willful blindness
to problems in how goods are produced, free marketers seem largely indif-
ferent to whether our trading partners meet even these minimum standards,
much less heightened environmental and workplace standards.
Bucking the assumptions of free-market advocates and the rich litera-
ture that assumes a flattened view of product competition in which price
trumps all other considerations, American consumption patterns attest to the
concern that many people have for how goods are produced and the condi-
tions of workers.4 Fair trade goods and certifications, once the province of
specialty stores such as Ten Thousand Villages, grace the aisles of groceries,
clothing stores, and even the low-price king, Wal-Mart. Activism, particu-
larly on college campuses, and media attention made the term "sweatshop"
mainstream and forced major brands to respond to accusations that they
were exploiting workers in their factories overseas. Historically, boycotts
have been used to protest everything from the slave trade to colonialism to
inadequate pay for migrant workers. Finally, preferences for locally or do-
mestically produced goods-promoted through, for example, the "Made in
the USA" campaign-reflect general concern about the decline in American
manufacturing and awareness that price alone should not necessarily deter-
mine consumption choices.5 But even as these examples6 refute the standard
assumption of consumer indifference to the supply chain and production
processes, they also highlight the limited nature of the options currently
available to socially minded consumers.
This Essay looks at the possibilities offered by offsetting to correct for
the poverty-related harms of consumption and to facilitate socially responsi-
ble consumption. Although underexplored and underinstitutionalized, pov-
erty offsetting promises to help consumers better integrate their social values
with their consumption patterns. What poverty offsetting provides is a way
for consumers to act upon their values without asking them to give up all
forms of consumption associated with poverty-related harm. This is particu-
larly important when it comes to poverty because the position that we should
renounce consumption altogether or limit our consumption to unambigu-
ously socially perfect products is largely untenable. Not only are few of us
(besides perhaps priests) willing to live the life of an ascetic, but also if we
were to drastically reduce our level of consumption, even if the reductions
were limited to those products associated with poverty, the poor could be
harmed by the resulting general economic decline. Although sometimes de-
rided as little more than the selling of consumption indulgences, offsetting is
4 Or, put differently, "Consumers ...often have 'preferences for processes.'" Kysar,
supra note 2, at 529.
5 Problematically, companies can wrongfully take advantage of this consumer preference
for nationally produced goods. See Emek Basket, The Causes and Consequences (f Wal-
Mart's Growth, 21 J. EcON. PERS. 177, 192-93 (2007) (discussing media coverage of Wal-
Mart putting "Made in the USA" labels on products produced overseas).
6 For other examples that show that "consumer decisions can be directly political," see
Michael Schudson, The Troubling Equivalence of Citizen and Consumer, 608 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. PoL. & Soc. Sc'. 193, 198 (2006).
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perhaps the best way for individuals to correct for the production and con-
sumption externalities of their consumption.
The first glimmer of poverty offsetting as a routine market practice can
be seen in the end-of-the-checkout-line charitable donation request. Al-
though probably most prevalent in grocery stores, charitable solicitations by
store employees at the moment of purchase are increasingly a standard part
of the shopping experience. Whether you are getting movie tickets or pay-
ing for your goods at an electronics outlet, the end-of-the-checkout-line re-
quest has become ubiquitous. The request comes just when you have your
wallet open and when-in light of the nature of the goods purchased and
your ability to make unnecessary purchases-you might be particularly will-
ing to donate. But, despite glimpses of consumer concern about production
processes, such donations and other forms of poverty offsetting remain pe-
ripheral to consumer expectations and the way that we conceptualize the
basket of products we consume. Equally significant, such calls to donate are
generally open ended and not tied to the goods purchased or the harms asso-
ciated with particular consumption choices.
Carbon offsetting offers a pointed contrast. Compared to carbon offset-
ting norms, poverty offsetting as it currently exists is underdeveloped and
underinstitutionalized. Decades of educating the public and lobbying efforts
are finally paying dividends for the environmental movement: people gener-
ally know that their consumption of gasoline, for example, imposes negative
externalities on the atmosphere. Partisan debate about how to address cli-
mate change aside, environmentalists deserve credit for having established a
baseline societal understanding that environmental harms are often associ-
ated with consumption. Among those consumers with disposable income, a
norm of making supplemental carbon offset payments is emerging.' This
norm is reinforced by the range of service providers and multiple ways that
consumers can offset their carbon emissions. The environmental offset mar-
ket offers offset options tied to household energy consumption, vehicle use,
airplane travel, and even weddings. Depending on the provider consumers
pick, their offset payments can go towards everything from methane capture
and reforestation to alternative energy projects and carbon market credits.
The environmental field has taken the lead in defining offsetting and estab-
lishing norms of consumption that recognize production and consumption
externalities. In practice, therefore, poverty offsetting likely will follow the
path blazed by environmental offsetting, with third-party providers playing a
critical transactional role collecting offset payments from consumers and
distributing these proceeds directly to the impacted producers or indirectly to
non-profits aiding those communities. Similarly, a mature poverty offset
market would support a range of providers who would compete on every-
thing from ease of use and service quality to transparency and measurable
outcomes. Poverty offsetting, and to some extent carbon offsetting as well,
'See Marc N. Conte & Matthew J. Kotchen, Explaining the Price of Voluntary Carbon
Off5ers, I CITIMATE CHANG EcON. 93, 93-95 (2010).
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is in its nascent stage, which means that it would be overly speculative to
define fully the evolution of offset institutions. But the future growth and
direction of poverty offsetting is predicted, and informed, by the rise in car-
bon-offsetting options and the related emergence of consumption-offsetting
norms.
The focus of this Essay is the relationship between poverty offsetting
and the state. In an earlier paper, Offsetting and the Consumption of Social
Responsibility, I explored the rise in offsetting and the motivations behind
offsetting. Taking off from there, this Essay begins, in Part I, by sketching
the contours of what an institutionalized form of poverty offsetting might
look like. The goals of such an institution are increasing awareness of the
poverty-related harms of consumption and transferring offset payments to
impacted communities. Part II discusses the relationship between poverty
offsetting and the state, moving from a thin conception of the state as merely
a market regulator to a thick understanding of the state as dynamically influ-
encing and responding to the market. Poverty-offsetting behavior can pro-
vide regulators with information about consumer recognition of the need for
market regulation and, by highlighting market shortcomings, might change
societal norms towards a stronger and more involved state when it comes to
the market. In Part III, I consider the citizen-consumer identity and the place
of economic tools in the fight against poverty in light of offsetting. I argue
that antipoverty advocates need to move beyond utopian rights discourse and
take seriously what markets can do to lessen poverty. Although this conclu-
sion will strike some readers as heretical, I believe poverty offsetting not
only invites unexpected allies to join the fight against poverty but also em-
bodies the pragmatic idealism the consuming public is prepared to embrace.
I. POVERTY-OFFSETTING INSTITUTIONS
The primary goal of poverty offsetting is to change the social norms
that surround consumption. By confronting the possibility of making sup-
plemental payments to alleviate the poverty associated with consumption,
consumers hopefully will consider and better understand the harms of con-
sumption. This goal is grounded in an appreciation of the role social norms
can play in human behavior and public policy. Nobel laureate Douglass
North writes:
Institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more for-
mally, are the humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction. They are composed of formal rules (statute law, com-
mon law, regulations), informal constraints (conventions, norms of
Rosser, supra note 1. One way to think about how these two pieces relate is that the first
is broader-covering offsetting, not just poverty offsetting-and more theoretical, while this
Essay has a narrower focus and is more pragmatic.
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behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct), and the enforce-
ment characteristics of both.9
This definition highlights that the distinctions sometimes made between for-
mal and informal rules may not be determinative of behavior.' In some
instances informal institutions (social norms) can work as well or better than
formal institutions (laws).
Creation of formal mechanisms for consumers to make offset payments
is an important first step, but the particular details of such mechanisms are
less important than the effect such mechanisms could have on consumption
norms. An institutionalized set of poverty-offset options would call atten-
tion to the relationship between consumption externalities and global pov-
erty. Just as societal knowledge of global warming and consumption
externalities is a necessary precondition for making headway on climate
change, there is tremendous value in getting people to consider the produc-
tion processes underlying the products they purchase. The idea that con-
sumption is causing poverty need not ground the recognition that social
responsibility extends to consumption choices. Although some people will
attribute causation to consumer indifference toward production standards
and worker treatment, it is enough if individuals recognize that the goods
they consume are problematically associated with poverty. " Poverty offset-
ting, by calling attention to this association, can help replace consumer apa-
thy regarding product origins with awareness of the human costs of the
products, and their low prices, enjoyed by consumers.
Consumer indifference-to whether suppliers pay workers a living
wage or a pittance, for example, or whether the production process ends up
condemning an area to poverty through excessive resource depletion-
manifests itself through the primacy of price. 2 The goal of increasing recog-
nition of the poverty-related externalities of consumption would be to
9 Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, in
THE NEw INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WoRLD DEVEiOPMENT 17, 23 (John Harriss
et al. eds., 1995).
1o A simpler proposed contrast such as, "[a] norm is a practice and a law creates an
obligation," risks overstating the difference between formal and informal rules because norms
can be subject to a range of enforcement mechanisms and be felt as obligations. Saul
Levmore, Norms As Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989, 1989 (2000).
" Although it is beyond the scope of this paper and at least the early project of poverty
offsetting, a more expansive understanding of the harms of consumption would consider not
only production externalities but also connection between consumption and inequality. See,
e.g., Juliet Schor, The New Politics of Consumption: Why Americans Want So Much More Than
The-y Need, Bos. REV. (1999), available at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR24.3/schor.html
(arguing that consumption practices "exacerbate and reproduce class and social inequalities"
and perhaps worsen income inequality).
12 Low prices force suppliers to reduce input costs-including wages and worker safe-
guards-to be able to hit price points. The rise of a few firms with sufficient market share in
the commercial sector that they can dictate terms to suppliers (Wal-Mart is the leading exam-
ple of such a company) contributes to the price and input cost pressure felt first by production
companies and ultimately by their workers. See Justin R. Watkins, Comment, Always Low
Prices, Always at a Cost: A Call to Arms Against the Wal-Martization of America, 40 J. MAR-
SHAL, L. Ryv. 267, 289-93 (2006).
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change how consumers relate to the market and could be met even if few
people actually make offsetting payments. 3 A dominant message of our so-
ciety is that individual worth is correlated with possessions and with con-
sumption levels. This cultural value pushes people to concern themselves
with what they can purchase and often to be (willfully in some cases) blind
to production and consumption externalities. Changing social norms so that
we take some responsibility for the association between poverty and many of
our purchases involves first exposing people to the idea of social harm asso-
ciated with consumption. Final goods are best understood as being situated
at the end of a production process that should matter to consumers. Expo-
sure to the related ideas that consumption sometimes is linked to poverty and
that a partial solution is available through offsetting will not convince every-
one to contribute financially. But exposure to poverty offsetting might in-
spire dialogue and more critical consideration of the nature of consumption.
Moving consumers from apathy to awareness of production externalities sets
the stage for individuals to act as socially responsible consumers and even
perhaps as citizens.
Poverty offsetting's second goal is to improve the lives of the poor, to
reach those who live in poverty even as they produce the goods we consume.
By funneling voluntary offset payments back to the communities suffering
the social externalities of production, poverty-offset payments could support
communities and workers struggling with poverty associated in one way or
another with production and consumption externalities. For all the academic
criticism of the limited utility of individual carbon offsetting in light of the
immensity of the problem of global warming, the desire of a subset of con-
sumers to voluntarily make supplemental payments to correct for consump-
tion harms suggests there might be a market for poverty offsetting. Socially
responsible consumption to date is largely understood in terms of environ-
mental impact: the use of renewable resources, clean energy inputs, sustaina-
ble production practices, and reduced packaging. Except for the limited
market in fair trade certified goods, social responsibility rarely is thought to
include the relationship between consumption and worker pay, for example.
By providing another mechanism for consumers to correct for the harms
associated with the goods they consume, the scope of socially responsible
consumption can be extended to include the whole range of products, inde-
pendent of whether companies choose to participate in certification regimes.
As a practical matter, the second goal is less amorphous and more
pragmatically challenging. Offering consumers a well-publicized and well-
placed poverty-offset option may be enough to raise awareness of poverty-
related consumption harms and thereby meet the primary goal. (Branding
" By focusing on social norm change as the primary goal, independent of the extent to
which individuals make offset payments, I hope to reaffirm the social aspect of norms. The
primary shortcoming of methodological individualism when it comes to social norms is that it
treats norms as simply reflecting individual utility functions and fails to recognize how norms
shape "the architecture of choice." Robert Ahdieh, Beyond Individualism in Law and Eco-
nomics, 91 B.U. L. REv. 43, 60 (2011).
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these offset institutions would be important, of course, and is best left to
experts, but I like the sound of GoodBuy, BuyRight, or, if it did not violate
intellectual property rules, ConsumptionPass.) But meeting the second goal,
creating a workable offset scheme, involves a number of institutional com-
promises. Although it would be easy to devise an offset scheme in a world
of perfect information and zero transaction costs, we do not live in such a
world. 4 The formal institutions of poverty offsetting would, therefore, have
to embrace a certain degree of ambiguity both in setting the offset terms and
in distributing the gathered funds on the back end. Resort to average-based
models on the receipt side-average harm associated with particular prod-
ucts or particular product types and average level of family consumption-is
a necessary second-best solution to the near impossibility of setting the off-
set amount to the shopping habits of each individual consumer. Similarly,
since it is overly utopian to suggest that offset payments will reach the par-
ticular workers associated with each purchase, as a pragmatic compromise
funds would need to be directed to poor communities.
Making poverty offsetting work requires reducing the project's informa-
tion challenges and related burden on consumers. Companies dedicate con-
siderable resources to tracking consumer behavior and purchasing trends.
When you swipe your loyalty card at many grocery chains, coupons tied to
your prior purchases are handed to you after checkout. Companies use real-
time information about customer purchases to determine how they use shelf
space and to move from large inventories to just-in-time delivery. The infor-
mation challenge of poverty offsetting is not that the information is not be-
ing collected, it is that those who hold the information are not likely to share
the information they collect on consumption behavior and even individual
consumers. Firms producing and selling products associated with social ex-
ternalities are likely to strongly oppose the poverty-offsetting idea. Besides,
making such data public would provide valuable information to competing
firms. The information challenges are even greater on the supply side where
the last thing most companies would want to do is acknowledge or call atten-
tion to negative production externalities.
Beset by information challenges and companies that will oppose the
project, for poverty offsetting to work, customers have to be offered simple
and transparent offset options. 5 Consumers do not track all their purchases
or investigate the way that each product came to market; therefore, a pov-
erty-offset scheme would have to rely upon a mix of self-reporting and con-
sumption approximations. Consumers could, for example, self-report the
amount of clothing they purchased in the past year and be offered an aver-
age-based offset. The amount of the offset would be based upon the associa-
14 See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, TIE MARKET, AND TE LAW 15 (1990); Reza Dibadj, Be-
yond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case ftr "Critical Legal Economics,"
2003 UTAH L. REv. 1155, 1162-66 (2003).
" For an example of a less than transparent consumption-as-charity program, see Sarah
Dadush, Profiting in (RED): The Need fi)r Enhanced Transparency in Cause-Related Market-
ing, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'I L. & Poi. 1269 (2010).
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tion between clothing purchases and poverty, averaging factors such as
extent to which clothing suppliers pay a poverty wage, whether the country
of manufacturing origin provides legal protection for workers, etc. As our
understanding of the association between poverty and production/consump-
tion externalities grows, the clarity and identification of the relevant factors
will also progress. Just as TerraPass offers travelers carbon offsets that vary
depending on whether they are flying regionally or cross-country, poverty-
offsetting options could be calculated by product, by product type, or even
by annual consumption across all types of products.
At the initial stage, poverty offsetting should not be presented as a per-
fect charitable product, but rather as a mechanism open to improvement and
responsive to the discussions sparked by the offset option. Creativity and
flexibility are likely to be more important than rigid understandings of how
poverty-offsetting theory should translate into program design. To en-
courage buy-in to the notion of offsetting, it may be useful to phase in the
options, tying them at first to large purchases or to products that have known
externalities or that are already associated with extremely low salaries for
workers or other forms of exploitation. A partial solution to the information
challenges of tracking consumption and consumption harms could involve
linking offset payments to credit or debit card usage. Banks already engage
in extensive tracking of individual consumer behavior and frequently make
this data available to their consumers. Teaming up with financial institutions
not only provides a possible way to work around the information obstacles,
but also, by using their resources to facilitate post-consumption transfers,
might open up a new line of business for banks. Creating such partnerships,
however, is likely to take time and should be approached with caution until
norms change such that consumers expect to be offered poverty-offset op-
tions. Another possibility is that bar code reader apps could be created to
help consumers easily track their consumption using their cell phones. But
in the meantime, the buyer-side information required for poverty offsetting
is likely to require individual record keeping and self-reporting.
The money generated by poverty-offset payments would flow to the
poor communities negatively impacted by production and consumption ex-
ternalities. Here too transparency regarding an evolving understanding of
such harms and the effective use of these supplemental payments would be
paramount. Fortunately, while offsetting knowledge and practice is just
emerging, the non-profit sector and international aid organizations have de-
cades of experience with the same and similar communities. Money col-
lected by one or more umbrella poverty-offset institutions could handle the
distribution of funds by channeling them through existing non-profits that
serve the poor communities impacted by production and consumption exter-
nalities. As is true with other domestic and international assistance efforts,
2012]
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the targeted communities should be included in the decision making regard-
ing how to use offset funds.'
6
Poverty offsetting would not end poverty but would help communities
in need. Poverty offsetting is not the sum total of our obligations to the poor
and offsetting alone is unlikely to raise enough money to put much of a dent
in global poverty figures. But just because we acknowledge that offsetting
will not be a magic bullet does not mean it cannot make an incremental
difference. Poverty offsetting need not displace existing antipoverty efforts
of governments, international bodies, and civil society; ideally, it would run
parallel to and support other efforts. The idea behind poverty offsetting
does, however, suggest that the baseline of our responsibility needs to be
raised at least to correct for the harms we benefit from through consumption.
The early phase of poverty offsetting is likely to be rocky, with many les-
sons-on what merits an offset, how offset payments should be structured,
and what to do with the money collected-only available with time and
experience. But as the project matures and social norms begin to embrace
the formal institutions of poverty offsetting, the mechanism can develop into
a novel and important way of correcting for the harms of consumption. Es-
chewing the ideological purity of advocating that the poor enjoy the paper
rights enshrined in international agreements and proclaimed by politicians,
poverty offsetting provides a pragmatic approach to working on the hard-
ships inherent in the association between consumption and poverty.'
v
6 The debates about the role community groups should play in the aid projects span more
than a half century. See, e.g., Kurt Finsterbusch & Warren A. Van Wicklin III, Beneficiary
Participation in Development Projects: Empirical Tests of Popular Theories, 37 ECON. DEv. &
CULLLRAL CHANGE 573 (1989); Morris E. Opler, Problems Concerning Official and Popular
Participation in Development Projects, 2 ECON. DEv. & CUI TURA CHANGE 269 (1954);
Trevor Parfitt, The Ambiguity of Participation: A Qualified Dejfnce of Participatory Develop-
ment, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 537 (2004). That being said, international organizations and
funders have started taking seriously the procedural value and substantive contributions that
come through the involvement of impacted communities. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, SCALING
Up LocAL & COMMLINILY DRIVEN DEVELOPMENI (LCDD): A REAL WoRLD GUIDE TO Its
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Hans P. Binswanger-Mkhize et al. eds., 2009), http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1237844546330/5949218-
1237844567860/ScalingUpLCDDBook-rfillesize.pdf (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) (discussing World Bank community-based efforts); see also Brant McGee,
The Community Referendum: Participatory Democracy and the Right to Free, Prior and In-
ftJrmed Consent to Development, 27 BERKELEY J. IN'L L. 570 (2009).
" Sidney Shapiro and Christopher Schroeder explain:
The pragmatist rejects the idea that the rationality of a belief can be established by
reference to a metaphysical concept. Instead, an idea is rational if it 'leads us into
more useful relations with the world.' In public policy, an idea is therefore rational
when it solves some specific problem better than existing beliefs and understandings.
Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic
Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTI. L. REV. 433, 469 (2008) (citations omitted).
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II. POVERTY OFFSETTING, THE MARKET, AND THE STATE
The relationship between poverty offsetting and the market can be char-
acterized in two very contradictory ways. On the one hand, poverty offset-
ting can be set up as a challenge to the free market. By calling attention to
the myriad ways in which production and consumption impose negative so-
cial externalities, poverty offsetting can be viewed as a threat to market and
free trade mythology. So long as firms follow the law, free-market purists
might say, consumers need not-and should not!-be concerned that their
consumption might be associated with poverty. On the other hand, poverty
offsetting might be thought of as fortifying the free market. Using the terms
and theoretical framework of economists, poverty offsetting merely seeks to
perfect the market. Instead of supporting a more radical reconsideration of
the market, poverty offsetting uses voluntary payments to mirror a property-
rights approach to social harms by asking that individuals internalize the
externalities of their consumption.'8 Yet, removed from the ideology of
these two characterizations, the relationship between poverty offsetting and
the market falls between these two extremes. This section proceeds in two
parts. First, I raise the possibility that offsetting can provide valuable infor-
mation regarding demand for increased market regulation. Second, I argue
that poverty offsetting can help build support for reigning in production ex-
ternalities and for an enlarged understanding of the state's role in the market.
A. State-Structured Markets and the Information of Offsetting
Politics and ideology shape how we see the market and how we under-
stand the state's role in setting the terms of market exchange. Poverty-offset-
ting behavior can help reveal areas where there is a need and demand for
regulation to limit market externalities. Despite claims that President
Obama is turning the country into a socialist state, the market economy is
thriving and in no danger of losing its structural support. Similarly, the idea
that a platonic ideal of the ("free") market exists independent of the state
and is not shaped by the state is also false and misleading. 9 This section
assumes the administrative state's role in defining the market and the terms
of trade and asks what such a state should do in response to, or in connection
with, offsetting. At a minimum, poverty offsetting should be regulated in
ways that defend against the possibility of industry capture and provide a
basic level of consumer protection. But the state could play a more engaged
role. Should poverty offsetting succeed in its primary goal of changing the
social norms that surround consumption, the state could use offsetting as a
I" For more on the assignment of property rights as a solution to externalities, see Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347 (1967).
" Robert Ahdieh appropriately criticizes "the relative inattention of law and economics to
questions of where markets come from .... [T]he literature simply assumes the existence of
markets, as something in the state of nature." Ahdieh, supra note 13, at 74.
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way of better understanding its dual role as market regulator and market
actor. Rather than being seen as wholly outside the realm of regulation,
poverty offsetting could provide a feedback mechanism on consumer de-
mand for market modifications in areas such as employment standards and
social protections in free trade agreements.
Although offsetting is only an emerging phenomenon and so far is con-
centrated on the problem of global warming, the need for regulatory over-
sight is already apparent. Poverty offsetting fits in the grey area between
regulation (requiring companies to solve the externality problem) and charity
(giving money to those excluded from the benefits of global capitalism), and
it shares the same dangers of industrial capture common to both government
policy and public interest work. The competition on price, not emissions
reductions, in carbon offsetting and the explosion of for-profit offset provid-
ers suggests that corporate greenwashing has probably already found at least
a partial home in this corner of the offset market.2 Though the nomencla-
ture for the equivalent in poverty offsetting does not yet exist, corporations
certainly have an incentive to exaggerate improvements in factory condi-
tions, for example, and deny the need for offsetting. Organizations provid-
ing poverty offsets similarly will be tempted to overemphasize the
effectiveness of the antipoverty efforts funded through the offset payments
they collect. The dangers of capture and inflated accounts of success are not
unique to offsetting. In the non-profit world generally, there is the increas-
ing acknowledgment of the need to develop and utilize appropriate systems
of metrics so that the sector can move beyond reliance upon anecdotal ac-
counts of success.
With the practice to date largely taking an ad hoc form, exemplified by
the end-of-the-checkout-line request, there has been little need to be con-
cerned about the tax and consumer protection implications of poverty offset-
ting. But successful poverty-offsetting institutions would change that. One
of the shortcomings of the end-of-the-checkout-line request is that the donor
does not get to claim a charitable deduction for his or her contribution.
Records are not typically kept of individual donors, and the company that
left the collection jar or box near the register often takes credit for raising the
funds contributed by their customers. Although it could be argued that you
as an individual should not be able to claim a deduction for simply cor-
recting for the harms associated with your own behavior, there is a clear tax
benefit to routing otherwise isolated donations through a poverty offset pro-
vider.21 Additionally, rather than being a donation that does not necessarily
2 See Rosser, supra note 1, at 73-74 (discussing the pricing of carbon offsets); see also
Jeffrey J. Minneti, Is It Too Easy Being Green? A Behavioral Economics Approach to Deter-
mining Whether to Regulate Environmental Marketing Claims, 55 Loy. L. REv. 653, 653-55
(2009) (discussing greenwashing).
2 The charitable deduction only benefits those taxpayers whose deductions exceed the
standard deduction, typically high-income homeowners able to take advantage of the mortgage
tax deduction. Since poverty offsetting would be a voluntary supplemental payment, however,
the class of contributors is likely to see value in being able to take advantage of this deduction.
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relate to the goods purchases, poverty offsetting would make explicit the
connection between the voluntary payment and the preceding consumptive
decisions. Institutionalizing poverty offsetting would bring post-consump-
tion charitable contributions more fully within the scope of consumer protec-
tion laws and under the purview of enforcement agencies. Because offset
providers would generally be channeling funds through existing non-profits,
policing overhead expenses and the percentage of funds that accomplish
their intended ends would be critical. Ensuring offset funds were used in
ways that accorded with consumer expectations would be the work of char-
ity monitoring organizations and, to a lesser extent, the regulatory state.
The emergence of offsetting, including poverty offsetting, hints at the
need for greater state involvement in the market. By blurring the line be-
tween regulation and charity, poverty offsetting improves our understanding
of the social and consumer interests of individuals by creating a novel feed-
back mechanism. In so doing, poverty offsetting invites the state to openly
participate in pushing greater social recognition of the need to acknowledge
and respond to production and consumption externalities. In some cases,
offset-inspired state engagement may take the form of greater regulation.
2
More generally, offsetting provides a way for consumers to nudge the state
to pay greater attention to social harms when establishing market and trade
rules. Regulation is not necessarily the end goal: offsetting highlights the
importance of an array of responses by large and small institutions, includ-
ing civic society. Indeed, some of the value of offsetting as voluntary sup-
plemental payments would be lost if regulation caused across-the-board cost
increases for all consumers. Poverty offsetting neither rejects regulatory
oversight of consumption externalities nor serves as a tool of the administra-
tive state, but instead highlights the need for a dynamic and ongoing reevalu-
ation of how consumers and governments account for production and
consumption externalities.
Individuals make offset payments because they are aware, most often
correctly, that their consumption imposes costs that the market does not ask
them to bear. By voluntarily taking on these costs, socially responsible con-
sumers correct for the harms of their consumption and also indirectly com-
ment on the externalities presently permitted. As a regulator, the state
navigates between a laissez-faire, anything-goes approach and one that pro-
tects citizens from being harmed by an unchecked market. Although some-
times enacted ex ante, regulations and market policing frequently come ex
post, after the failures of allowing the market to self-regulate become appar-
ent. Thus, the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911 led to improved con-
ditions for workers; the burning of Cleveland's Cuyahoga River in 1969
contributed to the formation of the Environmental Protection Agency; and
22 See Grant M. Hayden & Stephen E. Ellis, Law and Economics After Behavioral Eco-
nomics, 55 KAN. L. REv. 629, 629 (2007) ("Structuring incentives on any kind of large scale is
a job for governments, and the tool they use is the law."). Although this may over-generalize
the uniqueness of the government's role and the primacy of formal law, the government can
play a critical role supporting offset norms.
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today Congress is struggling with how to react to problems in the housing
market exposed by the mortgage crisis. Although it is probably impossible,
and perhaps even undesirable, to free politics from its tendency to be more
reactionary than prophylactic, offsetting could provide the state useful feed-
back in advance of a market crisis or an eye-opening event.
Offsetting behavior partly reveals our preferences about whether there
is too much or too little regulation in a particular area of the economy. Al-
though it runs counter to the project of this paper, if it turns out that people
are more willing to buy environmental offsets than poverty offsets, this may
be a signal, however imperfect, that regulating environmental externalities
may be more politically feasible than regulating economic externalities. Or
imagine that consumers had a range of options for poverty offsetting: one,
for example, tied to bringing worker pay up to a minimum standard and
another correcting for dangerous work conditions. Although corrective poli-
cies may be preferable regardless of which of these two options gets the
greatest response, the success or failure of different offset options could pro-
vide useful information about where the need for regulatory change is most
pressing.23 Politicians already rely heavily on polling data when deciding
what issues to tackle, but because it is associated with a payment, offsetting
may do a better job of revealing preferences and their intensity.
24
The likelihood that poverty offsetting could provide useful information
about the market to the state is perhaps greatest with regard to the positions
of the United States on international commerce and its trading partners.
Democratic and Republican presidents alike have championed trade liberali-
zation as a core component of our domestic economy and our economic
relations with the rest of the world. Accordingly, we have entered into an
ever-expanding number of free trade agreements and bilateral trade agree-
ments, not to mention the multinational trade regimes that we have joined,
such as the World Trade Organization. Through such agreements we gener-
ally expect tariff walls to fall and foreign investors not to be discriminated
2 There are many scholars who question the utility and appropriateness of using market
information, often by emphasizing that private decision making is not equivalent to social or
civic decision making. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rational-
ity: Moral Critiques of'Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CAmDozo L. REv. 431 (1996);
Lisa Heinzerling, Markets for Arsenic, 90 GEo. L.J. 2311 (2002); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir,
Consumer Prefrrences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J.
377 (1998); Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or Conflict and Contradiction
in Environmental Law, 12 ENVL'L. L. 283, 286 (1982). But as Kysar notes, Sagoff and others'
"powerful arguments failed to slow the movement toward greater reliance on private market
decisions as the standard for government provision of public goods ...." Kysar, supra note 2,
at 528 (highlighting, in particular, Mark Sagoff's contribution to the consumer/citizen prefer-
ence debate).
21 It is worth emphasizing that willingness to offset would only help determine political
demand. As is true of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), willingness to offset should not be treated
"as gospel or as some magic formula for deriving truth .... [It is simply] a pragmatic
decision-making tool that can help illuminate issues but need not dictate outcomes." Amy
Sinden, Cass Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 Coi.uM. J. ENVT'I,. L.




against.25 Our commitment to free trade is a commitment to the free flow of
capital and goods, not to the free movement of peoples or the establishment
of a shared set of production standards. Workers producing the same prod-
uct, consequently, can expect dramatically different wages and conditions,
depending on factory location. Offshoring of American jobs is but one pre-
dictable result; others include lax environmental standards and under-en-
forcement of labor protections in countries desperate for foreign direct
investment.26 As a result, poverty offsetting will often functionally be a way
for consumers to correct for production externalities permitted by our trad-
ing partners but not allowed within the United States.
B. Poverty Offsetting and Corrective Regulation
The most significant payoff from poverty offsetting is likely to be the
space it creates for consumers to push back against the externality-laden,
laissez-faire approaches to market regulation. In theory, and hopefully in
practice, the norms underlying offsetting support a strengthened, energized
state that is less timid when it comes to market regulation and market inter-
ventions. The social harms associated with the continual search for the low-
est possible production costs are only beginning to be understood. But there
is room for poverty offsetting to help dampen capital mobility and incen-
tivize better business standards and formal rights for workers. As the norms
surrounding offsetting develop, consumers may begin to look at pricing dif-
ferently. Rather than simply hunting for the good with the lowest price,
consumers might compare the true cost of competing goods across countries
with different production process standards. If offsetting becomes socially
expected and sufficiently robust, the cost of an article of clothing produced
in a poverty wage country, for example, would no longer be limited to its
low price tag. Instead the offset payment would have to be added to this low
price and that sum compared with the price of the good produced in a coun-
try that does not permit the social harms of poverty wages to be externalized
from production. Voluntary offset payments could also provide a gauge of
consumer dissatisfaction with free trade policies that do not incorporate en-
vironmental or social minimums.27 The willingness of people to make offset
21 See Frank Emmert, Labor, Environmental Standards and World Trade Law, 10 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75, 84-85 (2003) (summarizing what countries agree to by joining
the WTO).
26 See id. at 76-77 ("Higher standards for labor and the environment make the production
of goods and services more expensive. This can give a competitive advantage to a firm in a
country that does not share or enforce these standards.").
27 Incorporating such norms is fairly easy, and the United States has done so with several
recent bilateral investment treaties that carve out space for states to protect social values and
the environment without being subjected to suit by foreign investors. See also Catherine Jean
Archibald, Forbidden by the WTO? Discrimination Against a Product When Its Creation
Causes Harm to the Environment or Animal Welfare, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 15 (2008) (argu-
ing that process and production method distinctions fit within the framework of the interna-
tional trade regime); Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental "PPMs" in the WTO:
Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YAIE J. INT'I. L. 59 (2002) (same).
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payments could help determine the amount of political demand, among a
subset of the consuming public, that exists for the United States to step back
from laissez-faire free trade policies.28 Those who question trade liberaliza-
tion are often accused of either not understanding Ricardo or as advocating
out of self-interest. 29 But offset payments could help policymakers under-
stand the extent to which U.S. consumers are willing to act on a sense of
social responsibility and support related policy changes that transcend na-
tional borders and narrow self-interest.
3 °
Amending free trade policies is but an example of the sort of nudge that
poverty offsetting could give the state.3' The primary way this is done in a
democracy is through the ballot box and the direct election of representa-
tives, something that seems more like a push than a nudge. But as American
identity becomes increasingly wrapped up in consumer identity, the impor-
tance of opening up new mechanisms for policymakers to hear consumer
voice when it comes to market practices should also be recognized. Markets
can nudge politicians to rein in government debt (by discounting govern-
ment issued bonds), for example. But through offset payments and social
norm changes, poverty offsetting can provide an additional mechanism to
nudge the state.
But do the social-norm changes associated with poverty offsetting
nudge the state towards an enlarged appreciation for its role in the market
and an increased willingness to act? Or fundamentally does poverty offset-
ting support the position of those who imagine an idealized space for mar-
kets to function independent of state "interventions"? Though I think the
former is more likely, it is arguably the latter. By selling what some con-
sumers will treat as a consumption indulgence or a license to consume, free
of guilt, poverty offsetting raises a moral hazard problem. It also suggests
that a market mechanism can solve the problems of the market, and by so
21 Sungjoon Cho notes that the United States, for example, could "condition market ac-
cess upon compliance with minimum labor standards. ... Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free
Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT'I L. 625,
634 (2005) (summarizing the view of Sandra Polaski that this would lower poverty and ine-
quality for developing countries that complied). But Cho then argues against such conditioned
access by noting that without capacity -building assistance, "regulatory unilateralism works to
undermine free trade in the form of either further protectionism or development failure." Id. at
643-45. For an overview of the debates that surround unilateral imposition of labor standards
on trading partners, see David J. Doorey, In Defense of Transnational Domestic Labor Regula-
tion, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAI'L L. 953 (2011).
29 See Rosser, supra note 1, at 58-59 (providing a brief overview of Ricardo's explanation
of the gains made possible by free trade coupled with the power of comparative advantage).
30 An interesting alternative proposal blending government action with a market-based
mechanism worth considering is a government supported social-responsibility certification
scheme that would comply with free trade rules by allowing the continued importation of non-
certified goods. See Jessica Karbowski, Note, Grocery Store Activism: A WTO Compliant
Means to Incentivize Social Responsibility, 49 VA. J. INI'L L. 727, 738-745 (2009).
31 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALIH, AND) HAPPINESS (rev. ed. 2009) (arguing that slight changes in policy, in-
centives, or design can help people make better choices). But as used here, we can also think




doing arguably sidesteps regulation. Akin to Alan Greenspan's belief that
the housing bubble would solve itself, which led the Federal Reserve to fall
asleep at the wheel prior to the Great Recession, poverty offsetting arguably
encourages regulators to develop a trust-the-market attitude. If consumers
are correcting for the harms of their consumption, there is little need to adopt
corrective command-and-control regulations that would, for example, guar-
antee worker rights. The problems of global inequality and global poverty,
as well as the structural rules that facilitate the continued consumption be-
havior of privileged consumers, are immense. And one message that might
come out of poverty offsetting, that a voluntary supplemental payment will
solve these problems, is dangerous and counterproductive. 2
Conservatives and business interests enjoy the upper hand in American
debates about the government's role in the market. Even the election of a
Democratic president who campaigned on the slogan "change" and whose
administration assumed power in the wake of the near collapse of the finan-
cial system and a series of bank bailouts has not changed that. The mytholo-
gies of laissez-faire capitalism (the poor deserve their poverty and the state
should not interfere with the market) have a strong hold on the public imagi-
nation and discourse regarding state-market interactions. Progressives have
been unable to offer up a vision that competes with the Ayn Rand/Rand Paul
vision of limited government and minimal market regulation. The best they
can do is to continue marching down the well-used paths defending the pil-
lars of the New Deal, a worthy cause but hardly a rallying cry.33
The possibility that social norms inculcated by poverty offsetting will
support a stronger state is situational, not categorical. If America were
marked by citizens actively questioning market results and the increasing
inequality-that is, if our class consciousness approached that of our race
consciousness-then a market-based mechanism for responding to produc-
tion externalities might weaken the state. But when the baseline is general
consumer (and scholarly) indifference to consumption harms, poverty-offset
norms and the recognition of consumption harms can open up political space
for the government to take a more active role in regulating the market.
3 4 "It
depends" is not the sort of declaration that accompanies most proposals, but
only after acknowledging the weakened position of state regulation vis-h-vis
the ideology of the laissez-faire market does poverty offsetting make sense
32 Writing of similar dangers in cause-marketing campaigns, Barbara Stark observes,
"[p]ursuant to the cultural logic of late capitalism, global poverty would be addressed by
shopping, that is, by the very overconsumption that perpetuates it." Stark, supra note 3, at 29.
3' Relevant to this Essay, New Deal politicians, besides helping improve the social safety
net, also emphasized the "connections between good citizenship and consumption .... Con-
sumer spending provided a bulwark against the external threats of communism and fascism."
Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK L. Ryv. 827,
908-09 (2004); see also Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-War Paradigm in American
Intellectual Property Law, 31 Coi.uM. J.L. & ARTS 139, 148 (2008).
31 See Schor, supra note 11 (noting that "in the 1960s and early '70s, a far-reaching cri-
tique of consumer culture was a part of our political discourse," but this was short-lived and
"critics adopted a more liberal point of view, and deferred to individuals on consumer
issues").
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as a progressive response to market failures. The idea of the platonic mar-
ket, separate from government regulation, has such a hold on the public im-
agination that tools structured as market-based may be uniquely able to call
attention to consumption harms. Poverty offsetting is primarily valuable as a
way of changing the norms that surround consumption by helping to bring
about recognition that an individual's seemingly isolated act of consumption
has social consequences. Such recognition should create greater possibilities
for political, collective responses to production and consumption
externalities.
III. CONSUMER POLITICS
The consumption of social responsibility through offset payments opens
up the possibility of progress by leveraging consumerism and market struc-
tures in the fight against poverty where rights-based efforts have stalled.
Treating consumption as a moral issue runs counter to the separation of iden-
tity into discrete, hermetically sealed categories. By providing a tool for
individuals to bring their social commitments to bear on their consumption
behavior, poverty offsetting blurs the lines between aspects of our per-
sonhood and upsets the notion that consumer identity is fundamentally dis-
tinct from one's identity and role as a citizen.35 Positively, by forcing us to
recognize the spillover effects sometimes associated with consumption, pov-
erty offsetting may make us better consumers. But in so doing, might pov-
erty offsetting make us worse citizens?
Poverty offsetting suggests that individuals can meet their minimal so-
cial obligations through offset purchases. Engagement as a citizen may take
a backseat if people can simply buy their way out of being politically active
and involved in shaping collective solutions to social problems.36 Since only
a small fraction of consumers will be able to afford offsets and choose to
make such supplemental payments, poverty offsetting may have the unfortu-
nate effect of allowing those with the most resources to be able to remove
themselves from politics. Even those who do not purchase poverty offsets
may feel that the existence of such an option justifies not working on alter-
native antipoverty efforts, in much the same way that the possibility of redis-
tribution through taxation is used by conservative economists to disparage
and discredit less efficient welfare programs. Although an offsetting option
increases an individual's voice as a consumer, it may also facilitate exit from
the individual's role as citizen.3
" See id. ("Consumption is perhaps the clearest example of an individual behavior which
our society takes to be almost wholly personal, completely outside the purview of social con-
cern and policy.").
3 See Dadush, supra note 15, at 1305-07 (discussing this possibility in the context of
cause marketing).
31 See Rosser, supra note 1, at 40 n.35 and accompanying text.
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My view on the possibility that poverty offsetting will harm both Amer-
ican identity as citizens and political involvement is that the die has already
been cast. Regardless of whether offsetting is offered or not, we have be-
come a nation of consumers first and citizens second. 8 This may not be true
when pushed by major events such as 9/11, but in ordinary times and with
ordinary politics, we engage in consumption even as we disengage from
politics and civic society. For decades, the privileged have removed them-
selves from the problems of poverty and race, by moving first to the suburbs
and, when that was not enough, then to gated communities, private (or elite
public) schools, and upscale malls.3 9 But recognizing the decline in civic
and political engagement does not necessarily mean there is cause for de-
spair. To argue against offsetting as a way to advance the social good be-
cause it embraces a consumption-based approach assumes that the line
between our consumer- and citizen-identities ought to be defended. Why
should it? It seems to me that a socially responsible consumer may be better
than an apathetic citizen.4 1 Moreover, improving the social norms surround-
ing consumption may provide a better path to move consumers towards citi-
zenship than asserting that social responsibility should not inform how we
behave as consumers and resisting corrective mechanisms simply because
they are market-based.
Poverty offsetting draws upon consumer identity, but doing so is not the
same as conceding to a stripped down version of citizenship. Pragmatically,
poverty offsetting can draw upon the primacy of consumption today to
strengthen our commitment to help poor communities.4' Use of a market
mechanism should not, however, obscure the goals of such a project, though
its form might invite more people to participate. The poverty-offsetting
framework is built around correcting for harms enjoyed by individual con-
sumers, something that should resonate with those who see themselves as
conservatives and even libertarians. Moral calls to action on poverty have
been tried and politically are derided as the ideas of bleeding heart liberals.
Asking that the market improve through voluntary payments and that people
correct for externalities associated with their consumption avoids this trap.
The point is not that there is something wrong with being liberal-despite
38 See Eric J. Arnould, Should Consumer Citizens Escape the Market?, 611 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. Poi. & Soc. Sc. 96, 105 (2007) ("[W]e live in a historical moment in which market-
mediated consumer culture is the dominant social fact.").
" See, e.g., SHERYIJ. CASHIN, THE FAIIURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CiLASS
ARE UNDERMINING IHE AMERICAN DREAM 83-124 (2004).
" See Stephano Zamagni, Religious Values and Corporate Decision Making: An Econo-
mist's Perspective, Keynote Address at Religious Values and Corporate Decision Making: An
Interdisciplinary Interfaith Conference for Corporate Executives and Legal Counsel (2006), in
11 FoRDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 573, 581 (2006) ("The consumer as customer is somebody
who utilizes his or her purchasing power to maximize a utility function under constraint. The
consumer as citizen is somebody who wants more, wants also to express his or her cultural
identity and his or her moral sentiments .... ").
4' See Arnould, supra note 38, at 105 (highlighting the utility of rooting progressive prac-
tices in market forms).
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the fear politicians have of being so labeled 42 -but that using market mecha-
nisms may be a way to reach out to new allies and find political support in
unlikely places. People who believe in the power of the market to lift people
out of poverty ought to be concerned about production externalities and may
feel compelled to voluntarily offset those harms until those externalities be-
come associated with property rights.
Those who care about poverty have not yet found a home in the eco-
nomics-obsessed world of politics and policy today. The rights wave in pov-
erty law peaked with Goldberg v. Kelly,43 in which the Supreme Court,
citing Charles Reich's The New Property,44 recognized a right to welfare as-
sistance. 4- But that case was decided forty plus years ago (before I was born
in fact); the present Court seems primarily interested in protecting corporate
interests, not the interests of the poor. Welfare reform, by making welfare
no longer a right and allowing states to set their own standards for the social
safety net, dealt a severe blow to the poverty law community. In its wake,
the poverty law community was left at a loss for how to proceed: Should
rights-based advocacy continue to be the norm or do new tools need to be
found? Certainly, work could be, and was, done at the local level. But the
direction of future work remains unclear.
Economics has become the preeminent tool for analyzing policy, and
the law and economics approach has claimed a corresponding perch above
alternative ways of judging what works. 46 Justice, equity, and even the com-
mon law all bend in one way or another to the theoretical world view of
economics, rational actor assumptions, and assertions of the primacy of effi-
ciency. 47 In part because those who care about poverty have largely with-
drawn from the field, the economics approach that dominates is a
particularly conservative one that prioritizes market incentives above all
else. The challenge for progressives, and progressive administrations, is to
use economic and market tools for social ends, to reclaim the right to engage
in policy debates that draw upon economics and to create space for a broader
41 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 912
(1996) (noting the change in the social understanding of "liberal" to an insult).
4' Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970).44 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964).
4' Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261-63.
41 See, e.g., Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 17, at 435 ("[P]olicy analysts typically
operate within a single discipline dominated by its connections to economics .... ); Hayden
& Ellis, supra note 22, at 629 ("[T]he law and economics movement has become, by almost
any measure, the most dominant school of legal thought in the last half a century.").
47 The same can be said of some behavioral law and economics approaches that draw
attention to social norms by prioritizing standard law and economics values. See W. Bradley
Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of
Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (2002) ("If a rational-choice theory of law is objectionable
because of its overriding concern with efficiency or aggregate wealth maximization, at the




understanding of what markets can do.4 Stepping up to this challenge does
not mean giving up on the idea that people should have basic economic
rights, but it does involve taking the fight to where the debates are and to
where unlikely allies might be found. This Essay suggests one way that,
rather than advocating for formal rights with insufficient substance, we
could begin working on projects that take advantage of the place in our soci-
ety of both consumerism and market-based thinking.
CONCLUSION
Consumption and poverty are ubiquitous; poverty offsetting offers the
possibility of using the strengths of the former to make progress on the lat-
ter. By locating an obligation to the poor in production and consumption
externalities, poverty offsetting accomplishes two important things. First,
poverty offsetting grounds the baseline level of responsibility in correcting
for the harms of consumption that benefit consumers, answering the standard
critique that moral obligations to the poor are unbounded. Second, it pro-
vides a mechanism to change the social norms that surround consumption.
The current understanding of consumption as outside of the scope of politi-
cal concern shields our consumer identity from our commitments to social
responsibility. Offsets can be tailored to any manner of consumption, free-
ing socially responsible consumption from the subset of fair trade product
categories. Once we acknowledge the multiple layers of our personality and
identity, and we strip away the pretense that our consumer identity should be
walled off, we can admit the possibility that social responsibility might in
some context be best furthered by a market-based approach. Laments about
consumerism coupled with defenses of our distinct identity as citizens not
only fail to reflect the ascendency of our consumer identity but also may
mischaracterize the ideal mix of identities. Instead of seeing citizen and
consumer as belonging to separate boxes, maybe we should aim for a fluid
and dynamic relationship between consumer-citizens and citizen-consumers.
Moving from ad hoc post-consumption donations to charity to institutional-
ized poverty offsetting will allow consumers to better correct for the harms
associated with consumption, and will create more space for market-based
antipoverty work and for active state engagement with the market.
48 For an excellent discussion of how academics might productively participate in such
efforts, see Dibadj, supra note 14, at 1195.
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